'Self-help which ennobles a nation': development, citizenship, and the obligations of eating in India's austerity years by Siegel, Benjamin
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
History BU Open Access Articles
2016-05-01
'Self-help which ennobles a nation':
development, citizenship, and the
obligations of eating in Indi...
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version Accepted manuscript
Citation (published version): Benjamin Siegel. 2016. "'Self-Help which Ennobles a Nation':
Development, citizenship, and the obligations of eating in India's
austerity years." Modern Asian Studies, Volume 50, Issue 3, pp. 975 -
1018. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X14000493
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/39454
Boston University
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'Self-Help which Ennobles a Nation': Development, 
citizenship, and the obligations of eating in India's austerity 
years 
Siegel B, Modern Asian Studies, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the years immediately following India’s independence, the new nation’s political 
leadership, assisted by civic organisations and a network of women’s groups, sought to transform 
what, how, and how much Indians ate. Drawing upon wartime antecedent, global ideologies of 
population and land management, and an ethos of austerity imbued with the power to actualise 
economic self-reliance, the new state urged its citizens to give up rice and wheat, whose imports 
sapped the nation of the foreign currency reserves needed to forward a plan of industrial 
development. In place of these staples, Indian’s new citizens were asked to adopt ‘substitute’ and 
‘subsidiary’ foods -- including bananas, groundnuts, tapioca, yams, beets, and carrots -- and give 
up a meal or more each week to conserve India’s scant reserve of grains. And as Indian planners 
awaited the possibility of more fundamental institutional transformations in the form of agrarian 
reform, they looked to food technology and the promise of ‘artificial rice’ as a means of making 
up for India’s perennial food deficit. India’s women, as anchors of the household -- and 
therefore, the nation -- were tasked with facilitating these dietary transformations, and were 
saddled with the blame when these modernist projects failed. 
These projects, this article argues, embodied a broader postcolonial project to reimagine the 
terms of citizenship in a new nation characterised by fundamental scarcity. Indians were being 
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asked, through these dietary campaigns, to embrace notions of rights contingent upon the 
completion of duties, which in this case were the bodily transformations needed to actualise the 
economic self-reliance representing ‘real,’ and not merely formal, independence.1 India’s 
nationalist leaders had ascended to power with the promise of sufficient food for the nation's 
citizens, yet the actualisation of self-rule found those same leaders unable to deliver upon the 
promise of material well-being which had animated the final years of the nationalist struggle. 
Faced with enduring scarcity, and unable to marshall the resources needed to undertake 
fundamental agricultural reform -- particularly prior to the first Five-Year Plan period -- India’s 
planners placed greater faith in their ability to exercise authority over certain aspects of Indian 
citizenship itself. India’s three hundred and fifty million citizens, and its women in particular, 
were asked to remake daily practices in the name of national development and self-sufficiency, 
with the tools given to them by industrialists’ plans, women’s associations, and new scientific 
institutions. India’s postcolonial development regime, in a moment of uncertainty, imagined the 
remaking of citizenship as an integral precursor to reconstructing the national economy. 
By 1951, as the Planning Commission came to exert greater authority over national 
development, the state began to retreat from the project of reengineering citizenship through 
dietary transformation. Undertaking projects of land reform and agricultural improvement, 
India’s leadership transferred a smaller share of the burden of development onto its citizens, 
reanimating these schemes only at moments of acute scarcity. These schemes courted the 
resistance of opposition politicians, dissenting Congressmen, and citizens themselves, and by the 
advent of the ‘new agricultural strategy’ in the mid 1960s, the project of reengineering 
citizenship had been entirely eclipsed by schemes for technological advance. But for a key 
period immediately after independence, India’s national leadership saw in changed diets and 
artificial foodstuffs the possibility of renegotiating the terms of postcolonial citizenship itself. 
 
In recent years, historians and anthropologists have sought to situate the changing meanings 
of food and nutrition in modern South Asia, drawing upon foundational studies of Indian 
foodways, ecology, and religion.2 This work, in turn, led to a later series of investigations which 
                                                        
1. On this framework, see Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The 
Political Economy of the Indian State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 1011. 
2. See, for example, Arjun Appadurai, “Gastro-Politics in Hindu South Asia,” American Ethnologist 8, 
no. 3 (August 1, 1981): 494–511; R.S. Khare, Culture and Reality: Essays on the Hindu System of 
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identified the rise of nutrition as a governing heuristic for colonial administrators in between the 
two World Wars, giving a new language for those administrators to address the interlinked 
concerns of population growth, health, labor and food supply.3 An influential call to interrogate 
the formation and boundaries of Indian ‘national cuisine’ has seen a proliferation of studies of 
the transformation of cuisines and the cultural boundaries of food.4 Much of this work has 
centred around culinary transformations in Bengal in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, demonstrating how the rise of nutrition and transformations to the region’s food 
economy helped produce the Bengali Hindu middle class, facilitate bhadralok nationalism, and 
articulate cultural difference.5 A smaller proportion of this work has looked to North Indian 
regional contexts, looking to the rise of commensality in urban India, and examining how an 
inchoate public conversation about food in the Hindi public sphere underwrote the 
conceptualisation of an idealised and Hindu nation.6  
Most promising are those recent studies which have sought to demonstrate how the subjects 
of food, hunger, and nutrition underwrote conversations about welfare, political life, and national 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Managing Foods (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1976); R.S. Khare, “Hospitality, 
Charity, and Rationing: Three Channels of Food Distribution in India,” in Food, Society, and Culture: 
Aspects in South Asian Food Systems, ed. R.S. Khare and M.S.A. Rao (Durham: Carolina Academic 
Press, 1986), 277–96; R.S. Khare, The Eternal Food: Gastronomic Ideas and Experiences of Hindus 
and Buddhists (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992); and Francis Zimmermann, The Jungle and the Aroma of 
Meats: An Ecological Theme in Hindu Medicine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 
3. David E. Ludden, “The ‘Discovery’ of Malnutrition and Diet in Colonial India,” Indian Economic and 
Social History Review 31, no. 1 (1994): 1–26; Michael Worboys, “The Discovery of Colonial 
Malnutrition between the Wars,” in Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, ed. David Arnold 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 208–25. 
4. Arjun Appadurai, “How to Make a National Cuisine: Cookbooks in Contemporary India,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 30 (1988): 3–24. 
5. Utsa Ray, “Eating ‘Modernity’: Changing Dietary Practices in Colonial Bengal,” Modern Asian Studies 
46, no. 03 (2012): 703–29, doi:10.1017/S0026749X11000515; Utsa Ray, “The Body and Its Purity: 
Dietary Politics in Colonial Bengal,” Indian Economic & Social History Review 50, no. 4 (October 1, 
2013): 395–421, doi:10.1177/0019464613502413; and Jayanta Sengupta, “Nation on a Platter: The 
Culture and Politics of Food and Cuisine in Colonial Bengal,” Modern Asian Studies 44, no. Special 
Issue 01 (2010): 81–98, doi:10.1017/S0026749X09990072. See also E.M. Collingham, Imperial 
Bodies: The Physical Experience of the Raj, C. 1800-1947 (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity 
Press ; Blackwell Publishers, 2001). 
6. Benjamin Siegel, “Learning to Eat in a Capital City: Constructing Public Eating Culture in Delhi,” 
Food, Culture and Society: An International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research 13, no. 1 (2010): 
71–90, doi:10.2752/175174410X12549021368108; Rachel Berger, “Between Digestion and Desire: 
Genealogies of Food in Nationalist North India,” Modern Asian Studies 47, no. 05 (2013): 1622–43, 
doi:10.1017/S0026749X11000850. 
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development.7 Broadly, this work has posited a basic continuity in the terms of the food debate, 
from Indian economic thinkers’ critiques of the colonial state and its neglect of human welfare in 
the late nineteenth century to the idioms of national development in the decades surrounding 
independence, and the debates over the ‘right to food’ in contemporary India.8 While affirming 
the many continuities in India’s development discourses over time, this article posits a 
fundamental shift in paradigms of welfare and development in the years surrounding 
independence, as Indian nationalists assumed control of state institutions and retained the 
‘instruments,’ but not the ‘idioms,’ of national development.9 A recent treatment of food policy 
in these same years has identified a set of fundamental developmental tensions in independent 
India's food planning efforts; this article suggests that those tensions are best explained by the 
independent state’s appeal to new paradigms of postcolonial citizenship.10 
These paradigms, this article proposes, owed much to the promises made by Indian 
nationalists in the closing decades of colonial rule, and to the shift in developmental thinking 
which accompanied those same nationalists’ assumption of power in 1946-1947. Saddled with 
the need to reconstruct India’s economy, forward a plan of industrial development, and rid itself 
of the need for foreign imports, India’s leadership proposed a vision of citizenship wherein rights 
derived from the completion of responsibilities, and wherein preferences were to be subsumed in 
the name of development.11 Jawaharlal Nehru captured this paradigm succinctly when he 
                                                        
7. Sunil S. Amrith, “Food and Welfare in India, C. 1900–1950,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 50 (2008): 1010–35; Taylor C. Sherman, “From ‘Grow More Food’ to ‘Miss a Meal’: 
Hunger, Development and the Limits of Post-Colonial Nationalism in India, 1947–1957,” South Asia: 
Journal of South Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (December 2013): 571–88, 
doi:10.1080/00856401.2013.833071; Darren C. Zook, “Famine in the Landscape: Imagining Hunger 
in South Asian History, 1860-1990,” in India’s Environmental History: Colonialism, Modernity, and 
the Nation, ed. Mahesh Rangarajan and K Sivaramakrishnan, vol. 2, 2 vols. (Ranikhet: Permanent 
Black, 2012), 400–428; 
8. This work underscores what David Ludden has described as the consistent “cognitive terrain” of 
developmentalist thought in India from British rule to the present day. David E. Ludden, “India’s 
Development Regime,” in Colonialism and Culture, ed. Nicholas Dirks (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1992), 247–87. 
9. Sugata Bose, “Instruments and Idioms of Colonial and National Development,” in International 
Development and the Social Sciences, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), 52–53. 
10. Sherman, “From ‘Grow More Food’ to ‘Miss a Meal.’” 
11. Sudipta Kaviraj contends that Nehru’s India was characterized by a ‘pure statism,' without a strong 
redistributive expectation. It was literally a poor people's version of the welfare state, which had too 
little revenue to provide them with normal everyday welfare, but came to their rescue in a desperate 
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asserted that India’s citizens would ‘have to feel that they are partners in the great enterprise of 
running the State machine [...] sharers in both the benefits and obligations.'12 Nehru, and the 
state’s, implicit framework owed much to earlier contractualist models of citizenship, beginning 
with the colonial formulation of William Lee-Warner, and subsequently refined by jurists such as 
Srinivasa Sastri.13 It affirmed a communitarian reconfiguration of citizenship, wherein a citizen’s 
rights exist dialectically alongside responsibilities to co-citizens, rejecting the libertarian notion 
of citizenship holding rights to exist without attached and inherent responsibilities.14 And its 
representatives frequently adopted a religious or ethical idiom, drawing from precepts like that in 
the Bhagavad-Gita which suggested the right to perform a duty, but rejected a right to the fruit of 
that action.15  
The residents of independent India were indeed, as Srirupa Roy has argued, ‘infantile 
citizens,’ in need of ‘state tutelage and protection in order to realise the potentials of citizenship,’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
mitigation of crisis situations.' Sudipta Kaviraj, “On the Enchantment of the State: Indian Thought on 
the Role of the State in the Narrative of Modernity,” in The State in India after Liberalization: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. K. Sivaramakrishnan and Akhil Gupta, Routledge Contemporary 
South Asia Series 31 (London: Routledge, 2011), 36. 
12. W.H. Morris-Jones, “Shaping the Post-Imperial State: Nehru’s Letters to Chief Ministers,” in 
Imperialism and the State in the Third World: Essays in Honour of Professor Kenneth Robinson, ed. 
Michael Twaddle (London: British Academic Press, 1992), 233. 
13. Niraja Gopal Jayal, “Pedagogies of Duty, Protestations of Rights,” in Citizenship and Its Discontents: 
An Indian History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013), 109–35. From a small body 
of Hindi literature on postcolonial citizenship, see Amba Datt Pant, Bharatiya Savidhan Tatha 
Nagarikta [The Indian Constitution and Citizenship] (Allahabad: Central Book Depot, 1959), 
particularly 97–117. 
14. This formulation and the tension between the two models is found in Upendra Baxi, “The Justice of 
Human Rights in Indian Constitutionalism,” in Political Ideas in Modern India: Thematic 
Explorations, ed. V.R. Mehta and Thomas Pantham (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006), 263–84. 
Baxi’s second bibliographic note offers a comprehensive overview of the literature on rights and their 
genealogies in South Asia; of particular note is G.S. Sharma, Essays in Indian Jurisprudence 
(Lucknow: Eastern Book, 1964). For a related discussion, with references to these categories in a 
more formal, legal sense, see Marc Galanter, “Introduction,” in Law and Society in Modern India, ed. 
Rajeev Dhavan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), xiii–c. A recent ethnographic account of how 
rights may be vernacularly mediated in the South Indian context is Ajantha Subramanian, Shorelines: 
Space and Rights in South India (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2009). 
15. See Bhagavad-Gita 2:47-51. On postcolonial ethics and connections to religious imperatives of 
ordinariness and abnegation, see Leela Gandhi, The Common Cause: Postcolonial Ethics and the 
Practice of Democracy, 1900-1955 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). On the state’s use 
of Gandhian conceptions of citizenship, see Ornit Shani, “Gandhi, Citizenship and the Resilience of 
Indian Nationhood,” Citizenship Studies 15, no. 6–7 (October 2011): 659–78, 
doi:10.1080/13621025.2011.600066. 
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and offered rights only conditionally by the new nation-state.16 Yet the category of citizenship 
itself in early independent India drew creatively upon preexisting social and economic debates, 
and carried with it an increased appeal to ‘public service,’ virtue, and the maintenance of 
national order.17 These appeals were increasingly linked to larger questions of national 
development.18 And it was in the state’s campaigns for dietary transformation, this article argues, 
that the connections between the responsibilities of citizenship and the burden of national 
development were made most explicit.19 
 
Global Population, National Planning, and Wartime Experimentation 
 
India's mid-century efforts to remake the national diet drew inspiration from a broad range of 
late colonial antecedents, from the rise of population as a global and a colonial problem to the 
idioms of nationalist planning and wartime experiments in food policy. 
                                                        
16. Srirupa Roy, Beyond Belief: India and the Politics of Postcolonial Nationalism (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2007), 20. Elsewhere, Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests that this qualified package of 
rights was situated within a broader, 'pedagogical' idiom of postcolonial politics. Leaders of Asian and 
African countries broadly 'thought of their peasants and workers simultaneously as people who were 
already full citizens--in that they had the associated rights--but also as people who were not quite full 
citizens in that they needed to be educated in the habits and manners of citizens.'⁠ Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
“The Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of Culture,” in Making a World After 
Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives, ed. Christopher Lee (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 2010), 53–54. 
17. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, “‘In the Name of Politics’: Democracy and the Power of the Multitude in 
India,” Public Culture 19, no. 1 (2007): 35–57; William Gould, “From Subjects to Citizens? 
Rationing, Refugees and the Publicity of Corruption over Independence in UP,” Modern Asian 
Studies 45, no. Special Issue 01 (2011): 33–56, doi:10.1017/S0026749X10000302; Eleanor 
Newbigin, “Personal Law and Citizenship in India’s Transition to Independence,” Modern Asian 
Studies 45, no. Special Issue 01 (2011): 32, doi:10.1017/S0026749X10000338. On the complex 
genealogy of postcolonial citizenship, see also Joya Chatterji, “South Asian Histories of Citizenship, 
1946–1970,” The Historical Journal 55, no. 4 (2012): 1049–71. 
18. ‘Particularly in the years 1946 to 1956,’ Stuart Corbridge argues, ‘the war on poverty in India was 
conceived in terms that proposed a close link between the remaking of India and the making of 
modern citizens.’ Stuart Corbridge, Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 52. Anand Pandian suggests that rural 
citizens, in particular, have since independence been identified as ‘subjects of development, [who] 
must submit themselve to an order of power identifying their own nature as a problem.’ Anand 
Pandian, “Devoted to Development: Moral Progress, Ethical Work, and Divine Favor in South India,” 
Anthropological Theory 8, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 159, doi:10.1177/1463499608090789. 
19. This argument draws inspiration from the essays in C.J. Fuller and Véronique Bénéï, The Everyday 
State and Society in Modern India (London: Hurst & Co., 2001). 
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In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, Indian economic thinkers transformed 
India's pervasive hunger from a Malthusian inevitability into a trenchant critique of colonial 
rule.20 Yet as famine and hunger emerged as political concerns -- threatening colonial 
administrators not only with death and disease, but with shocks to labor and revenue collection -- 
these administrators began to abstract the idea of India's 'population' as a problem of 
governance.21 These developments dovetailed with a broader, global perception of the world's 
population and its anticipated 'overpopulation': in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
experts across the world began to interlink the planetary problems of 'land, migration, territory, 
soil, density, emptiness, arability, colonisation, and settlement.'22 In the colonial context, the 
questions of land, populations, and their diets, health and productive capacity for labor grew 
increasingly interconnected, frequently through the new scientific language of nutrition.23 In 
India, these concerns began to take institutional form in the 1920s: the founding of the Nutrition 
Research Laboratories in Coonoor, and the subsequent publication of India's first nutrition 
textbooks demonstrated how the legitimacy of colonial sovereignty had grown sutured to the 
improvement of lands and human health. And studies like American anthropologist and 
                                                        
20. Sugata Bose, “Pondering Poverty, Fighting Famines: Towards a New History of Economic Ideas,” in 
Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen, ed. Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur, 
vol. II: Society, Institutions, and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 425–35. On 
colonial famine policy and vernacular visions of dearth and hunger, see Ravi Ahuja, “State Formation 
and ‘Famine Policy’ in Early Colonial South India,” Indian Economic Social History Review 39, no. 4 
(2002): 351–80; S. Ambirajan, “Malthusian Population Theory and Indian Famine Policy in the 
Nineteenth Century,” Population Studies 30, no. 1 (1976): 5–14; David Hall-Matthews, “Colonial 
Ideologies of the Market and Famine Policy in Ahmednagar District, Bombay Presidency, C. 1870-
1884,” Indian Economic & Social History Review 36 (1999); and David Hardiman, Feeding the 
Baniya: Peasants and Usurers in Western India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
21. Sarah Hodges, “Governmentality, Population and Reproductive Family in Modern India,” Economic 
and Political Weekly 39, no. 11 (March 13, 2004): 1157–63. 
22. Alison Bashford, “Nation, Empire, Globe: The Spaces of Population Debate in the Interwar Years,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 173–174. Bashford has, in a 
major recent intervention, interrogated the paradigm of ‘global population' through the international 
and interdisciplinary Anglophone experts who first met in and around the 1927 World Population 
Conference, among them Radhakamal Mukerjee and John Boyd-Orr, discussed below. Alison 
Bashford, Global Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014). Elsewhere, Samantha Iyer has suggested that colonial ideas of population 
forged in this period served as the foundation for later Cold War development theories. Samantha 
Iyer, “Colonial Population and the Idea of Development,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 
55, no. 1 (2013): 65–91, doi:10.1017/S0010417512000588. 
23. Ludden, “The ‘Discovery of Malnutrition.’”; Worboys, “The Discovery of Colonial Malnutrition 
between the Wars.” 
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missionary Charlotte Viall Wiser's influential five-year survey of food habits in a United 
Provinces village suggested how Indians' putatively fixed habits -- a colonial bogey since at least 
the turn of the twentieth century -- might be rebuilt along scientific lines.24 
Indian nationalist planners, by the 1930s, had begun to conceptualise an increasingly 
bounded Indian economy, proposing the need for 'national food planning' in the name of self-
sufficiency.25 As Indians increasingly began to perceive the nation as a body whose national 
development would be predicated upon 'morally and physically healthy citizens,' they looked to 
the promise of 'reconstruction' to restore that body to health.26 Reconstruction would not only 
plan for food production to meet India's growing needs, but would repair the structural defects of 
India's food economy: beyond problems of production, the nation's food stores were further 
lessened a deficient transportation system and poor storage facilities which condemned supplies 
to rot and consumption by rodents and insects. Gandhian thinkers further decried the waste of 
industrial food practices, from the milling of rice to the manufacture of vanaspati [vegetable oil] 
-- but they and modernist planers alike agreed that nearly ten percent of India's food was wasted 
annually.27 The imperatives of national food planning were most powerfully expressed by 
                                                        
24. “Note on the Work of the Nutrition Research Laboratories, Coonoor,” 1940, Mysore Residency - 
Mysore Residency Bangalore - 598-D, 1940, National Archives of India; Robert McCarrison, Food: A 
Primer for Use in Schools, Colleges, Welfare Centres, Boy Scout and Girl Guide Organizations, Etc., 
in India (Madras: Macmillan, 1928); Charlotte Viall Wiser, The Foods of a Hindu Village of North 
India, Bureau of Statistics and Economic Research, United Provinces 2 (Allahabad: Superintendent, 
Print. and Stationery, United Provinces, 1937), 115–116. The ‘unchangeable’ character of Indian diets 
fuelled at least one colonial fiction in the form of Rudyard Kipling's 1896 short story, ‘William the 
Conquerer,’ wherein a sympathetic but misguided administrator from the Punjab sends wheat and 
millet to famine-striken, rice-eating Madras. Disaster is averted when an enterprising engineer feeds 
the grain to goats to give milk to starving children, instead. 
25. Sunil Amrith and Patricia Clavin, “Feeding the World: Connecting Europe and Asia, 1930–1945,” 
Past & Present 218, no. suppl 8 (2013): 38. 
26. Benjamin Zachariah, “Uses of Scientific Argument: The Case of ‘Development’ in India, C. 1930-
1950,” Economic and Political Weekly 36, no. 39 (2001): 3689–3702. The project of reconstruction as 
a palliative to India's economic stagnation had been clearly articulated as early as 1920, with the 
publication of engineer Mokshagundam Visvesvaraya's Reconstructing India; fourteen years later, his 
Planned Economy for India forwarded a plan for increasing the productivity of Indian agriculture. 
Mokshagundam Visvesvaraya, Reconstructing India (London: P.S. King & Son, 1920); 
Mokshagundam Visvesvaraya, Planned Economy for India (Bangalore: Bangalore Press, 1934). 
27. Joseph Cornelius Kumarappa, Our Food Problem (Wardah: All-India Village Industries Association, 
1949), 3–4; M.R. Masani, Your Food, a Study of the Problem of Food and Nutrition in India 
(Bombay: Padma Publications for Tata Sons Ltd., 1944), 66; Baljit Singh, Population and Food 
Planning in India (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1947), 85–88. On rice milling, see David Arnold, 
“Technology and Well-Being,” in Everyday Technology: Machines and the Making of India’s 
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Radhakamal Mukerjee, the Lucknow-based polymath who tied together the concerns of 
population, land use, and food planning in a series of influential publications in the 1930s and 
early 1940s, most notably his 1938 Food Planning for Four Hundred Millions.28 Among his 
proposals was a forceful call to promote 'a mixed diet based on several staples' in place of rice 
and wheat, promoting beans, pulses, and edible roots as salutary for national health, and 
invaluable 'insurance against the shortage of staples.'29 
India's nationalist planners and their incipient institutions began to echo the call for a 
transformed diet: in 1935, the nationalist physicist Meghnad Saha began underwriting, through 
the National Institute of Science, the publication of Science and Culture, a journal which 
emerged as the primary vehicle for debates over the future course of national reconstruction.30 In 
an early issue, Subhas Chandra Bose submitted to the journal a list of key questions about 
national planning, asking whether it would be desirable to plan a national diet for India.31 The 
question of a 'standard diet' did not presuppose the flattening of culture in the name of national 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 121–47. The question of waste would 
endure through the Green Revolution to the present day: advertisements for metal boxes in the late 
1960s would tout India's waste as the structural defect necessitating the ‘necessary evil' of rationing, 
while later advocates of foreign direct investment in food continue to use waste and inefficiency to 
legitimise their investment proposals. Metal Box, “Necessary Evil? [Advertisement],” Eastern 
Economist, January 7, 1966; Amy J. Cohen, “Supermarkets in India: Struggles over the Organization 
of Agricultural Markets and Food Supply Chains,” University of Miami Law Review 68 (2013): 19–
323. 
28. Radhakamal Mukerjee, Food Planning for Four Hundred Millions (London: Macmillan, 1938). A 
complex discussion of Mukerjee's thought and career is in Bashford, Global Population, passim. 
29. Radhakamal Mukerjee, The Food Supply, Oxford Pamphlets on Indian Affairs 8 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1942). See also Mukerjee's later discussion of the use of ‘inferior food grains’ with 
reference to population pressures in Radhakamal Mukerjee, Race, Lands, and Food: A Program for 
World Subsistence (New York: Dryden Press, 1946), 52–53. 
30. A discussion of Saha's influence on India's nationalist leadership and its embrace of planning, see 
Deepak Kumar, “Reconstructing India: Disunity in the Science and Technology for Development 
Discourse, 1900-1947,” Osiris 15 (January 1, 2000): 241–57; on Saha's later critique of the use of 
science in independent India, see Abha Sur, “Scientism and Social Justice: Meghnad Saha’s Critique 
of the State of Science in India,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 33, no. 1 
(2002): 87–105. 
31. Subas Chandra Bose, “Some Problems of Nation-Building,” Science and Culture 1, no. 5 (October 
1935): 258. Science and Culture explored the potentialities of such a transformation in its pages, 
delivering a broadly affirmative response at a Science News Association meeting in August 1938. 
“Improvement of National Diet,” Science and Culture 2, no. 2 (August 1936): 95–96; D. Dutta 
Majumder, “Subhas Chandra and National Planning,” Janata: A Journal of Democratic Socialism 47, 
no. 2 (February 23, 1992): 11–17. On Bose's political ideology more broadly, see C.A. Bayly, 
“Subhas Chandra Bose and ‘World Forces,’” in Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of 
Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 325–29. 
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unity, but it did animate discussions over systematic agricultural planning with India's food 
needs in mind. When the Congress Working Committee, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru, met that 
same year to formalise a plan of national reconstruction, it recommended that such planning be 
coordinated with the new Central Nutrition Board.32 Yet Congress' planning agenda was 
interrupted in 1939, when Britain's declaration of war against Germany on behalf of India led to 
the party's mass resignation from its provincial ministries.  
The experience of the Bengal Famine of 1943 underscored the fundamental insecurity of 
diets deriving their weight from cereal staples, and the need to fashion a national diet more 
resilient to inevitable disruptions. In the wake of famine, India's colonial administrators 
relinquished moral authority over the food question, leaving nationalists with a potent claim to 
legitimacy. Yet those nationalists would take many cues from the colonial government's embrace 
of austerity, and a new set of economic paradigms linking individual behaviour to national 
outcomes. In the face of nationalist ferment, the British government relied increasingly upon the 
putatively neutral idioms of economics to express wartime imperatives.33 And it was under the 
auspices of the Permanent Economic Adviser to the Government of India, Sir Theodore Gregory, 
that the transformation of individual consumption was formally sutured to the promise of 
national strength. Gregory, a confidant of John Maynard Keynes, had served in this position 
since 1938, exerting a heavy influence over India's wartime economic planning.34 His 1941 
treatise, 'Problem of Personal Economy in War-Time,' posited an intensified connection between 
individual behaviour and macroeconomic outcomes during wartime: even if India's scarcity 
                                                        
32. Jawaharlal Nehru, Report of the National Planning Committee, 1938 (New Delhi: Indian Institute of 
Applied Political Research, 1988), 154. An incisive assessment of Nehru's experience with the 
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conditions allowed for only minimal reduction of consumption, Gregory asserted, guidance, 
exhortation, and 'sumptuary legislation' were well-suited to Indian economic and cultural 
contexts.35 Gregory's oversight of many food committees suggests his influence on later state 
projects. As Chair of the 1943 Foodgrains Policy Committee, Gregory moderated a dispute 
between Debi Prasad Khaitan, a Calcutta jute merchant representing the Indian Chamber of 
Commerce, and W.H. Kirby, Rationing Advisor to the Government of India.36 To Khaitan's 
suggestion that, in the new Calcutta rationing program, individuals be granted some mechanism 
for choosing their preferred grain, Kirby and Gregory affirmed the notion that choice should be 
'entirely subsidiary' to 'keeping the people off the starvation point.' The notion that preference 
should be subsumed to national ends would grow increasingly important as nationalist food 
planners took control of policy-making bodies. 
Wartime events would bring this notion to new prominence in the Food Department. The fall 
of Burma in 1942 prompted a memorandum within the department suggesting that the public 
should be encouraged to replace rice with other grains, since a preponderance of India's rice 
stores were alleged to come from Burmese imports.37 By early 1944, Delhi's Lady Irwin College, 
the premier institution of home economics in India, had been tasked with planning wheat and 
kambu [pearl millet] dishes for South India's 'habitual rice-eaters'; in Hyderabad, a thousand 
people were reported to have attended a cooking demonstration at the War Services Exhibition.38 
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The import of Australian wheat in September led the Madras government to add wheat in place 
of some of its rice ration, with a 'wheat propaganda officer' appointed to help popularise its use. 
And along the Malabar coast, ninety-three public and private 'Civic Restaurants' were set up to 
showcase new recipes. Yet the alleged beneficiaries of these schemes chafed at the notion that 
their diets were composed of interchangeable calories. Bombay's nationalist Free Press Journal 
decried its citizens' 'being made to swallow barley' in place of regular grains.39 'Who are the 
people whose food is barley,' it groused, 'and for whose benefit was this barley ordered?' 
Rationing officers had looked favourably upon the deployment of wheat and tapioca in India's 
South.40 But in Cochin, famine relief workers with experience in distribution noted that tapioca 
could only be deployed in dire emergencies to pad 'those parts of the stomach which the ration is 
not enough to fill.'41 
Indians' putatively unchangeable dietary preferences -- particularly those of rice-eaters -- 
were occasionally used to exculpate colonial officials for its late colonial failings. Beverly 
Nichols' Verdict on India, a popular apology for British rule in India, recounted a train ride spent 
with an Indian officer in the Food Administration in the wake of the 1943 famine. 'Food,' 
Nichols recounted the officer declaring, in an exoneration of British famine policy 'means [rice], 
and nothing else. It doesn't mean meat, nor fish nor eggs nor potatoes; it doesn't mean corn, nor 
millet, nor even bajri [pearl millet] which bears many resemblances to rice. [...] If you gave 
[Bengalis] anything else, most of them wouldn't know what to do with it.'42 Yet in the final years 
of colonial rule, the Department of Food increasingly touted the possibility of Indian dietary 
reform. In late 1944, W.R. Aykroyd -- the influential nutritionist and Director of the 
government's Nutrition Research Laboratories in Coonoor since 1935 -- noted that wartime 
efforts had 'shown that it is possible to exercise a considerable degree of control over the diet of 
the people,' and that popular canteens staffed by women might be useful in promoting 'socially 
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inferior' grains in peacetime.43 Ground-level administrators debated the quantity of millets, 
maize, or other grains which could be substituted in rations before courting public disaffection.44 
But so, too, did they follow the example of the Madras Food Department, which in early 1946 
appointed a permanent public relations offer charged with a press, radio, poster, pamphlet, and 
cinema campaign designed to explain rationing and austerity schemes, and to popularise 
unfamiliar foods in the hungry south.45 These eleventh hour campaigns hinted at the more 
ambitious reengineering of citizenship and diets in tandem that India's nationalist leadership 
would soon attempt. 
 
 
 
 
Independence, National Reconstruction and the Food Question 
 
The post-war ascension of the Indian National Congress to power saw a fundamental 
transformation to the orientation of development planning. The nationalist leadership, prior to the 
war, had ‘intended to accomplish what they had critiqued the colonial state for not being able to 
do, i.e., to bring about the benefits of material progress through scientific means to be shared 
equitably among all citizens.’46 Yet its post-war assumption of centralised state power saw the 
Congress ‘[lose] sight of the vision of eradicating poverty, morbidity, and illiteracy that had 
inspired the debates on national development in the colonial era’: the ‘instruments’ of national 
                                                        
43. W.R. Aykroyd, Notes on Food and Nutrition Policy in India (New Delhi: Manager of Publications, 
Government of India Press, 1944). On Aykroyd's career in India, see Kenneth J. Carpenter, “The 
Work of Wallace Aykroyd: International Nutritionist and Author,” The Journal of Nutrition 137, no. 4 
(April 1, 2007): 873–78. Among Aykroyd's younger colleagues in Coonoor was M. Swaminathan, 
widely seen as the progenitor of the Green Revolution in India. W.H. Kirby, too, noted that wartime 
rationing had 'proved a ready and good medium for popularising the use of unfamiliar foodgrains, 
[providing] alternative food in place of the foods in acute short supply.'⁠ Bureau of Public Information, 
Government of India, “Necessity for Food Control Measures: Rationing Adviser on Benefits of Food 
Rationing,” October 5, 1945, IOR/L/E/8/7236, British Library. 
44. “Inclusion of Millets, Gram and Maize in the Cereal Group Rations: H.M.’s Meeting with Bombay 
Food Advisory Council,” March 1, 1946, Food - Rationing - RP-1000/62/1946, National Archives of 
India. 
45. H.K. Matthews, “Letter to F.W. Brock,” April 12, 1946, IOR/L/I/1/1104, British Library. 
46. Medha Kudaisya, “‘A Mighty Adventure’: Institutionalising the Idea of Planning in Postcolonial 
India, 1947–60,” Modern Asian Studies 43, no. 4 (October 2008): 940. 
     14 
development came to enjoy primacy over its ‘idioms,’ drawing greater inspiration from colonial 
bodies like the Department of Planning and rather than Congress’ National Planning 
Committee.47 
Famine in Bengal and enduring post-war shortages had underscored the calls for a 
transformed national diet: the National Planning Committee, meeting in 1945 and 1946, affirmed 
that wartime experiences had 'woken up Government to its wider sphere of duty: [meeting] the 
food requirements of the people.'48 Another subcommittee on national priorities, chaired by 
Jawaharlal Nehru, affirmed that in 'any well-conceived plan of national Development, the 
provision of adequate food must be the most important item with the highest priority.'49 As world 
food prices soared, provincial rations were slashed, and India’s representatives petitioned for an 
increased allotment of grains at the Combined Food Board in Washington DC, the formation of 
India’s interim government in September 1946 saw control of India's food policy shifted into the 
hands of veteran Congressman Rajendra Prasad, designated Minister of Food and Agriculture.50 
Yet as the incipient government forwarded the imperatives of economic self-reliance, shifting the 
object of development from human welfare to national autarky, it looked increasingly to citizens 
themselves to undertake the burden of that task.51 
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As nutritionists and economists continued to draft plans for the reconstruction of India’s food 
economy and national diet, customers voiced resentment at the substitutes for wheat and rice 
which continued to appear in their rations.52 India's Bureau of Public Administration, recognising 
'the difficulty of persuading the people to consume [coarse] grains such as maize and barley,' 
suggested that shops appeal to consumers' sense of national sacrifice when distributing them.53 
The Congress leadership increasingly framed the food crisis as a matter best solved through 
individual or household-level action, affirming in a December 1945 meeting that 'everyone 
should realise his personal duty [regarding food] and perform it to the best of his ability, 
believing that if everyone acted likewise India will be able to surmount all difficulties with 
courage and confidence and be able to save thousands of poor lives.'54 A Congress Working 
Committee meeting in March 1946 contended that the responsibility for conserving scarce 
foodstuffs fell at the level of the household.55  
Simultaneously, Indian scientists were envisioning new technologies by which individuals 
and households might actualise their duty to conserve. Addressing the 1946 Indian Science 
Congress in Bangalore, the agricultural scientist M. Afzal Husain called for the establishment of 
a 'National Institute of Food Technology' to incubate synthetic foodstuffs: beyond promoting the 
consumption of yeasts, tapioca, and tubers, reducing cereal consumption and freeing land for 
valuable cash crops, the institute would promote 'synthetic rice' to free India from the ravages of 
Malthusian logic.56 Later in the year, the chair of the Indian Institute of Sciences's biotechnology 
department, V. Subrahmanyan, wrote to the Ministry of Food to propose that a new Food 
Conservation Board include in its mandate the promotion of 'less commonly used food materials' 
like groundnuts, soybeans, sweet potato and tapioca, which had been given new priority in 
planning.57'A year later, the scientist would publish an extensive article in Science and Culture 
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outlining his plan for an organisation in New Delhi that would undertake this task.58 The 
journal’s editors responded approvingly, contending that ‘that which appears to be a strange 
method of getting food today may become the usual method tomorrow.’59 
The arrival of independence in August 1947 saw India’s citizens looking expectantly to the 
state to make good on its promise of sustenance. The depth of India’s food crisis had grown even 
more pronounced by partition: the bulk of British India’s arable land was now across the border, 
in Pakistan. The refugees who streamed into camps in West Bengal needed massive quantities of 
foodgrains, and those who arrived in cities strained India’s already-overburdened rationing 
system.60 Beyond its immediate human toll, communal violence also frequently saw the looting 
and burning of urban grain stores.61 Days after independence, the new nation’s Department of 
Information and Broadcasting asked press members to help stave off food riots, warning that 
‘India’s political freedom must not be allowed to prove illusory by a complete collapse on her 
food front.’62 ‘Until now,’ the author of a Hindi booklet, Our Food Problem, wrote a few months 
before independence, ‘we have blamed the British for the food problem. But now, as they 
prepare to depart, we are confident that our own, people-loving government will reach out to 
farmers, increase our national production, and increase the prosperity of the people through the 
proper distribution of food.’63 A Congress organiser, introducing a book on Our Food and 
Population Problem, affirmed that same nationalist promise a few months later. ‘If a country 
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cannot give its citizens the right food,’ he asked, ‘and enough of it, are not its economic 
arrangements useless?’64 
Indian industrialist, eager to free the Indian economy from imports and increase its citizens’ 
purchasing power, asserted a distinct influence over the nation’s economic arrangements. Two of 
the authors of the ‘Bombay Plan,’ the textile magnate Lala Shri Ram and industrialist 
Purshottamdas Thakurdas, quickly assumed control of two major food planning bodies.65 Shri 
Ram, who would soon be placed in charge of the subsidiary food campaign, reached out to 
representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture's 'Grow More Food Campaign' in June 1947.66 
Predicting the agricultural losses of partition, Shri Ram encouraged the Ministry to promote the 
production of potatoes, yams, beets, carrots, and tapioca. The Indian consumer should 'turn to 
maize, bananas, and date palms, and above all, grow food in every free area of land. [Not] doing 
so should be considered an unpatriotic act.' Rajendra Prasad soon appointed a Foodgrains Policy 
Committee with Thakurdas as its chair. Thakurdas -- who had previously chaired Bombay’s 
Provincial Food and Commodity Advisory Board and the Central Foodgrains Policy Committee 
of 1943 -- echoed Shri Ram in recommending the inclusion of subsidiary foods in rations to 
lessen the demand for cereals.67 
The recommendation of these industrialists prompted loud objections. Bombay’s Supply 
Commissioner wrote to the Committee to protest, noting that 'bananas, sweet potatoes, carrots, 
turnips are supplementary and not substitute foods.'68 P.C. Joshi, general secretary of the 
Communist Party of India, lambasted the ‘reactionary recommendations of the [committee] 
dominated by representatives of Big Business and rich growers,’ which had eschewed discussion 
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of agrarian reform.69 Yet objections like these were soon drowned out by state representatives 
who increasingly linked the question of diet to citizens’ responsibility for national unity and 
development. In March 1947, Rajendra Prasad presided over a 'Food and Nutrition Exhibition' in 
Delhi, showcasing alternatives to wheat and rice through lectures, films, and cooking 
demonstrations to female guests.70 In December 1948, the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting requested media outlets to join the campaign for changed diets, appealing 'to the 
upper class people to avoid and discourage all activities involving waste of food, and to urge on 
them the need for a minimum use of cereals in their diet, [enabling] the less rich classes to get 
more cereals.'71 
In the months after independence, Nehru and the Congress’ left-leaning modernisers’ 
national food planning schemes were assailed by Mohandas Gandhi, who, with the support of 
influential businessmen, successfully campaigned against food controls.72 Yet Gandhians and 
modernists found common ground in asking citizens to steward the project of self-sufficiency in 
food. Decrying the ‘centralisation of foodstuffs’ in an October 1947 prayer meeting, Gandhi 
asked citizens to grow food at home and undertake regular fasts. ‘'If the whole nation realised the 
beauty of [religious] partial self-denial,' he contended, 'India would more than cover the deficit 
caused by the voluntary deprivation of foreign aid [...] If many must die of starvation, let us at 
least earn the credit of having done our best in the way of self-help, which ennobles a nation.'73 
 
Votaries of a village-centred model of India’s economic reconstruction would lose out to the 
modernising vision of the Nehruvian state. But on the food front, Jawaharlal Nehru and other 
bureaucrats would frequently use the Gandhian language of self-reliance, denial, and cooperation 
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to express the imperatives of state-driven development.74 As prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
endorsement was materially and symbolically essential in the campaign for Indians to practice 
austerity and transform their food habits. In public, Nehru cast these tasks as fundamental 
responsibilities of postcolonial citizenship, framing personal transformation and individual 
responsibility as a critical instrument for national development.75 Privately, Nehru brooded over 
the nation’s foundering agricultural schemes and Indians’ unwillingness to cooperate with these 
plans in what Judith Brown had described as the Prime Minister’s characteristic 'exasperated 
paternalism.'76 
The Prime Minister’s support underwrote new scientific initiatives: the Council of Scientific 
and Industrial Research had called, at independence, for a laboratory to advance food technology 
in the service of the nation, and Subrahmanyan was tasked with establishing it on land donated 
by the Mysore government.77 Nehru inaugurated the All-India Institute of Food Technology in 
late 1948. 'We are eating wrong things,' Nehru declared in his address, 'and we are eating too 
much of them.'78 Nehru exhorted the Institute to help India conserve foodstuffs by developing 
'new types of composite foods which will be useful in times of emergency.'79 The veteran 
Congressman C. Rajagopalachari -- long a foe of centralised planning on Gandhian grounds -- 
would later defy the Prime Minister by unilaterally removing food controls in 1951, as Chief 
Minister of Madras. But at the inauguration, the then-Governor General of India echoed the 
Prime Minister in a second address. 'If the cow or the goat,' the Rajagopalachari asked, 'can build 
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her own body and make and give beautiful milk out of the simple grass or leaves she eats, why 
should man with all the science available to him relegate grass and leaves to the realm of 
inedible things?'80 
Returning to Delhi, Nehru directed the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in February 1949 to 
examine whether Delhi's open spaces -- including the length of New Delhi's imposing Rajpath, in 
particular -- could be used to plant food crops, as an example of the importance of citizens 
growing their own food.81 On the same day, inaugurating a planned township several hours from 
Delhi, the Prime Minister reported that he had begun subsisting on a mixture of wheat and sweet 
potato flower, and urged citizens to emulate his example. 'The people,' he warned, 'should 
understand their duties and responsibilities [...] in making the motherland great. They talk of 
rights and privileges -- and forget all about duties.'82 Nehru’s timing was not incidental: 
privately, the Prime Minister was lamenting the failure of the Grow More Food campaign, 
complaining about Food Minister Jairamdas Daulatram's mediocre performance in a letter to C. 
Rajagopalachari, and urging a redoubling of the effort to promote new foods as staples.83 
Addressing the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Nehru estimated that 
the 10% food deficit India faced in a bad year could be compensated for only through increased 
output, more land, or inducing Indians to changing their food habits en masse.84  
The advisory visit of John Boyd-Orr to India in April and May lent new credence to Nehru's 
exhortations. The former secretary of the Food and Agriculture Organisation had long viewed 
India as one of the world’s most important battlegrounds in world’s struggle for more food: 
Boyd-Orr had contributed a foreword to Nagendranath Gangulee’s’s 1939 primer on nutrition in 
India, and the FAO Chief’s proclamations were cited reverentially in Hindi texts on food and 
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population.85 Boyd-Orr spoke at Teen Murti, the Prime Minister's residence, to urge 'a war-like 
psychology and drive on the part of the people and Government alike' with regard to the food 
problem.86 Several days later, Nehru delivered an address on All India Radio, insisting that 'there 
must be no waste and there must be no feasting while we fight for every ounce of food.'87 Nehru 
repeated the call in several addresses over the following weeks, exhorting every Indian to think 
of him or herself as a ‘soldier on the food front,' planting food crops and stamping out waste.88 
Media across the political spectrum rallied behind the Prime Minister’s suggestions.89 Nehru 
wrote to India’s Chief Ministers in summer 1949 to encourage them to replace the rice or wheat 
in their province’s rations with a substitute starch once a week, and to grow subsidiary foods on 
their estates.90 Nehru did so himself in July, having the lawns of his residence planted with 
groundnut, millet, maize and sweet potatoes, in addition to bananas, tapioca, bitter gourd, and 
aubergines -- harking back to the Second World War, when the Viceroy and several governors 
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and princes replanted their own estates as vegetable gardens.91 Indira Gandhi gave tours to 
visitors, and Nehru proudly proclaimed that his household was free of rice, subsisting instead 
upon sweet potato.92 
Aware of the impropriety of public feasting in the face of widespread shortage, India’s food 
ministers met in Delhi in August 1949 to discuss the imposition of new food austerity measures. 
Extending wartime legislation, the Ministry of Food enacted a uniform, national Guest Control 
Order structuring the types and quantity of food legally permissible at gatherings, allowing for 
unlimited attendees at events where non-rationed food would be served, and capping the number 
at twenty-five for those serving wheat or rice.93 (Provincial governments, however, balked at the 
enforcement of these rules, and even ministerial gatherings saw them flouted.94) 
These enforcement failures did little to shake Nehru from his belief in the possibilities of 
remaking Indian notions of national responsibility through dietary transformations. Britain's 
High Commissioner reported on these campaigns with anxiety, worrying that directives like 
Nehru's were inadequate palliatives for India's serious food problem.95 Yet Nehru expressed a 
deepening commitment to the notion that Indians must remold their diets in the name of national 
development. In a letter to Jairamdas Daulatram in late October, Nehru encouraged the Food 
                                                        
91. Among other booklets issued, see Indian Council of Agricultural Research, Vegetable Growing in the 
Delhi Province, 2nd ed., ICAR Booklet 5 (New Delhi: Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, 
1946). 
92. “Compound Lawns Become Farm,” Times of India, July 25, 1949. In 1942, a confidante had written 
of Nehru’s embarrassment at the indulgent, Western tastes he had inherited from his father, Motilal, 
contending that the only ‘weakness’ he indulged was an ‘an occasional demand for mashed potatoes.’ 
In 1943, at the height of the Bengal Famine, Indira and Jawaharlal exchanged several letters on the 
need to plant wheat and rice at Anand Bhavan, their family residence in Allahabad. See Krishnalal 
Shridharani, Warning to the West (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), 259; and 'Letter from 
Nehru from Ahmadnagar Fort Prison, September 23, 1943,' in Indira Gandhi, ed., Two Alone, Two 
Together: Letters between Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru 1940-1960 (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1992), 273–274. 
93. Ministry of Food, “Food Policy - Austerity Measures - Guest Control,” November 1, 1949, Home - 
Public - 51/373/49, National Archives of India. 
94. Unable and often unwilling to undertake the burden of monitoring transgressions, particularly as the 
decontrol of foodgrains outpaced the Order's withdrawal, individual states began to flaunt these 
regulations, forwarding alternate Guest Control Orders at the provincial levels or sometimes 
discarding them altogether. Within several years, the Order had been effectively withdrawn 
throughout the country. “Food Austerity Measures,” 1957, Agriculture - Basic Plan - 86(1)57 BP II, 
National Archives of India; “Food Austerity Measures Adopted by the Assam Government,” July 12, 
1952, Food - Basic Plan - BP.II/1085(36)/50, National Archives of India. 
95. United Kingdom High Commissioner, New Delhi, “Extract from Opdom #26 for the Period 23 - 30 
June 1949,” June 30, 1949, IOR/L/E/8/7237, British Library. 
     23 
Minister to cut out rice from the rations allotted to wheat-eating areas. 'We must take this risk in 
regard to rice,' Nehru wrote, 'and I believe that the country would be prepared for it, if only we 
set about it in right earnest and tell them what we are doing and what we expect them to do. If 
certain pinch is felt here and there, we need not be afraid.'96 When West Bengal's Chief Minister, 
B.C. Roy, wrote to Nehru to appeal for increased provision of foodgrains, the Prime Minister 
tied his support to a demand that Roy persuade Bengalis to change their food habits. 'It is 
dangerous,' Nehru warned, suggesting that Bengalis might take to tapioca, 'for us to be 
subservient to a particular type of food which may not be available tomorrow. We live on the 
verge of a world war, and no one knows what will happen.'97 Implicit in Nehru’s order was the 
notion that adherence to regional tastes was an impediment to forging the type of citizenship that 
would forge national unity through national self-reliance.98 
 
Miss-a-Meal, Subsidiary Foods, and the Indian Ersatz 
 
In the wake of independence, public officials and institutions were increasingly expected to 
embody emerging notions of citizenship and service, and representatives of civic society 
similarly took this task upon themselves.99 Accordingly, the state-driven efforts to transform 
diets through an appeal to the responsibilities of citizenship were matched by a parallel effort 
from civil society. In September 1949, a group of Indian leaders -- including representatives of 
the Congress, the Constituent Assembly, the All-India Harijan Sevak Sangh, the Servants of 
India Society, All-India Refugee Association, All-India Women's Conference, the All-India 
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Hindu Mahasabha and the All-India Anglo-Indian Association -- signed their support for the 
'Miss a Meal Movement,' organised by Jag Parvesh Chandra, a Lahore refugee turned Delhi 
politician, consumer advocate, and Congress worker.100 The group asked Indians to pledge to 
give up one meal a week, contributing the grains saved to a national fund, and in so doing, foster 
'the national habit of uniting and striving jointly at a time of crisis and emergency.'101 
Rajendra Prasad and Rajkumari Amrit Kaur -- a founder of the All-India Women's 
Conference, and independent India’s new health minister -- gave early support, prompting 
bureaucrats and politicians nationwide to affirm their own approval.102 The Governor of Punjab’s 
pledge of drawing only six days’ rations was followed by the Bombay premiere’s announcement 
that he would be skipping two meals a week; Bengal’s Minister of Civil Supplies declared that 
he had given up rice altogether.103 Citizens were urged to make food pledges, like that asked of 
non-cultivators in Bombay to 'reduce my consumption of food grains by using non-cereal foods 
and to avoid wastage of food in the kitchen and on the table.'104 Ration shops in Uttar Pradesh 
began to stock pledge forms, and representatives of Government godowns announced that they 
would reduce grain supply to stores in proportion to the number of pledges received.105 
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In early 1950, Chandra spoke about the movement to a gathering of businessmen and 
bureaucrats in Hyderabad, estimating that the movement would make up for 7% of India’s 
estimated 10% total food deficit, saving approximately 400 crores rupees each year -- 'the total 
sum of the amount spent by the nation on 52 meals a year.'106 Yet more than killing the black 
market and freeing India from the yoke of foreign imports, missing a meal would 
train you in the art of self-discipline, for control of the palate, as Gandhiji taught us, was 
the basis of self-discipline[.] A country become a great nation, when the people living in 
that country are not just human beings but think, behave, and act like true citizens, ready 
to discharge their duties willingly and gladly. A true citizen is he who thinks more of his 
duties and less of his rights; for in the final analysis, rights flow from duties well 
performed. Rights divorced from the performance of duties, is a contradiction in terms 
and a mockery of democracy. 
Chandra’s speech neatly linked together the project of dietary transformation and the 
reimagination of rights in postcolonial India. Yet his movement was not infrequently lambasted 
as misguided and ineffectual. One former prince wrote to Chandra to gripe that 'Out of the 300 
and odd millions [in India], His Highness thinks not more than one million could profitably miss 
a meal. The other 300 million are so under-nourished that they should get an extra meal and not 
miss a meal.'107 Orissa’s Law Minister concurred that 'more than half of the population do not get 
two meals a day [...] To such a population I feel diffident to suggest the campaign of fasting.'108 
Yet the ethos resonated in official publicity. Addressing the nation over All-India Radio on the 
food crisis and the perils of foreign aid, Nehru urged Indians to take up the Movement’s 
signature act. 'Each one of us,' he enjoined, 'should demonstrate active sympathy and desire to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 Make in daily meal this sure, 
 Eat less rice or rice no more. 
 Ask your people waste no food. 
 Love your Country love your food.⁠ 
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help by giving up one meal a week.'109 Nehru proposed sending surplus foodgrains to send to 
famine victims, and the Ministry of Food began to devise mechanisms for collecting and 
distributing them.110 
 
As public institutions and representatives of civil society urged an austerity ethos, the Central 
Food Technological Research Institute and the government’s Subsidiary Food Production 
Committee worked to provide the institutional and scientific mechanisms for the transformation 
of Indian diets. In early 1949, as scarcity loomed once more, the Ministry of Health had inquired 
of state governments whether banana roots were eaten by the poor in their respective provinces, 
looking to promote them in daily diets and scarcity crises alike.111 The Ministry of Food 
examined a similar proposal to distribute imported Iraqi dates in place of rationed cereals.112 
These schemes grew more concrete with the creation of the Subsidiary Food Production 
Committee, chaired by industrialist Lala Shri Ram, and staffed by the senior Madras bureaucrat 
Sonti Ramamurty and the Secretary of the Ministry of Food. Shri Ram reported directly to 
Rajendra Prasad, and asserted 'that meeting the shortage of food is not merely the business of the 
Governments but of the 330 million people of the country.'113 Taking as its mandate the 
promotion of bananas, sweet potatoes, tapioca, groundnut flour and synthetic cereals, the 
Committee met throughout the following year, building upon the work of the 1947 Foodgrains 
Policy Committee. The Committee’s report posited that a 'substantial reduction in the 
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consumption of cereals in this country' could be effected through the production and 
consumption of alternate foodstuffs, beginning by appointing Development Officers to foster the 
expansion of each crop.114 
The campaign offered, at least in theory, the possibility of feeding more citizens at no cost to 
the state. And as one British intelligence offer reported, the 'attempt to persuade the public to 
change their diet by eating more 'substitute' foods like potatoes and sweet potatoes is discernible 
in all statements by government officials about food self-sufficiency.'115 One such statement 
came from Governor-General C. Rajagopalachari, who called in a radio address for a 'fanatical 
zeal' for the food campaign. 'The fashion must be set,' he said, 'for greater consumption of ragi, 
cholam, maize and millet. [...] Like jail-going, hobnobbing with outcastes, spinning, [and] 
wearing Gandhi-caps, millet food must be made a patriotic high class fashion.'116 In August 
1949, Shri Ram petitioned India’s provincial food members to embrace the campaign, through 
publicity and by bringing subsidiary foods into the ration as soon as production targets were 
met.117 The Ministry of Food similarly asked provincial ministries to consider distributing 
subsidiary foods in place of wheat and rice, requesting rationing administrations to estimate 'how 
far [their] increased consumption can be popularised.'118 By the end of the year, a glut of bananas 
and sweet potatoes were being made available at cooperative stores and ration shops in Bombay 
Province; in the new guest control and public austerity measures enacted across India the 
following year, subsidiary foods would continue to be permitted in unlimited quantities.119 
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 Indian’s putatively unchangeable preference for rice over any other grain worried administrators of 
international aid, as well. During the shortages of 1950-1951, American representatives fretted over 
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Encouraged by the drive for subsidiary and substitute foods, the CFTRI revived earlier, 
futuristic proposals for an ersatz grain to replace rice and wheat. The Institute’s director, V. 
Subrahmanyan, had pledged to underwrite Nehru's promise of food self-sufficiency by 1951, 
promising that a quarter of the nation's grain consumption could be replaced by that date with 
sweet potatoes or tapioca.120 'Artificial rice' would be a key component of that campaign. As 
early as 1945, the nationalist agricultural scientist M. Afzal Husain had postulated that since 
'chemists have produced rayon, nylon, [and] plastics,' there should 'be no reason why they cannot 
produce artificial rice from tuber starch.’121 And a decade earlier, Sonti Ramamurthy of the 
Subsidiary Food Production Committee had witnessed a Travancore Maharaja importing tapioca 
into the state during the war. The schoolchildren fed on tapioca alone, Ramamurty recalled, were 
'rickety,' but the civil servant continued to tout the possibility of a rice substitute based on tapioca 
supplemented with groundnut flour for protein.122 In 1948, Ramamurty had contracted a 
manufacturing firm in Coimbatore to formulate a prototype, and on the Subsidiary Food 
Production Committee, he took charge of the 'artificial rice' project, while Lala Shri Ram steered 
the production of 'a flour mixed from tapioca and wheat flour to make chapattis in North India.' 
Publicly declaring his intent to manufacture a substitute cereal that would satisfy 'the psychology 
of people accustomed to eat cereals,' Ramamurty asked the CFTRI's V. Subrahmanyan to 
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undertake pilot trials for the rice in Kerala.123 A pilot plant was established in Mysore, and the 
Committee set to work formulating distribution plans for South and North India.124 
The project captured the imagination of the bureaucrats whose more staid agricultural 
schemes were stagnating. In April 1951, Rajendra Prasad sampled chapatis and halva made from 
tapioca in the CFTRI laboratories.125 In the summer, Subrahmanyan was called to speak to 
ministers in Travancore-Cochin about the possibility of scaling up consumption of synthetic 
rice.126 In Delhi, one minister surprised colleagues with the announcement that the rice they had 
eaten at lunch was in fact the CFTRI’s ersatz version.127 'The grains that we now make are 
round,' V. Subrahmanyan proclaimed at the pilot plant in Mysore, but 'we can make beautiful, 
white rice-shaped grains which can satisfy even the most fastidious consumers.'128 
Fastidiousness aside, Indian consumers took poorly to these ersatz grains, evidencing scant 
demand. An early, critical assessment from Madras, pointed to the reluctance of producers to 
switch to tapioca from proven cash crops, and the dim potential for the 'dietetic habits of a nation 
[to] be altered by propaganda, persuasion or fiat.'129 The conclusion was not unwarranted. 
Artificial rice was deployed to a small famine in Southern India in 1952, but there was little 
interest outside of famine conditions.130 The first artificial rice factory in Trivandrum was 
shuttered shortly after its inauguration.131 Save for a small number of famine victims in 
Rayalaseema, producers in Mysore, and enthusiastic bureaucrats in Delhi, few Indians ever 
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tasted the much-touted artificial rice.132 Before production could be adequately scaled up, the 
state had grown reluctant to ask citizens to reimagine their rights, their responsibilities, and their 
diets in tandem.133 
 
Unequal Burdens 
 
As male bureaucrats and scientists forwarded the twinned imperatives of austerity and 
alternate foodstuffs, Indian women, the 'anchors of the household,' were saddled with the burden 
of remoulding the diets of their husbands and children, and in so doing, recasting the relationship 
between the household and the nation. 
Colonial planners and nationalist organisations had cast women as essential agents of India's 
national development, interweaving the aims of household health and national well-being.134 One 
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of the earliest primers on 'domestic science' in India linked the promulgation of the field to the 
advancement of national health and hygiene.135 W.R. Aykroyd would nonetheless lament, a 
decade later, that 'the women of India have not yet been enlisted in the campaign for improved 
nutrition'; the National Planning Committee's 1938 sub-committee on 'woman's role in planned 
economy' suggested that women would play a key role in constructing a national diet after 
independence.136 During the Bengal Famine, the left-wing Mahila Atmaraksha Samiti -- the 
'Women's Self-Defence League' -- had affirmed repeatedly that women's duties towards the 
nation were split equally between self-defence and the provision of food.137 The connection 
between the maintenance of the home and the uplift of the nation grew more explicit after 
independence. Social worker Rameshwari Nehru would write, shortly after independence, that 
'the home is the foundation on which the structure of society is built,' and that its improvement 
would ultimately underwrite national development.138  
The All-India Women's Conference, well-connected to the mainstream Congress leadership, 
emerged as the dominant voice of nationalist women after independence.139 One of the 
Conference's Presidents would declare that 'our aim is to make the woman a healthy and useful 
member of society; a good mother, self-reliant, and a responsible citizen conscious of her rights 
and responsibilities.'140 Those rights and responsibilities quickly converged around the provision 
of food to the home and the nation. In 1946, the AIWC declared that the fourteenth of every 
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month was to be designated a 'Special Food Day,' tasking each chapter with teaching its 
members 'the duty of the people to cooperate' in the tasks of avoiding waste and using substitute 
foods.141 A second resolution in 1949 saw the AIWC ask its members to begin growing 
substitute foods in kitchen gardens; soon, the group organised mobile demonstrations and 
canteens to promote the same.142 One member asserted that the conservation of food and the 
promotion of new foodstuffs 'is a work suited primarily to the genius of women. Let it not be 
said that women have failed in a task of such supreme national importance.'143 
Yet even as the AIWC affirmed, through its initiatives, the state's contention that 'women, 
more than men, could effectively help Government in the solution of food problem,' India's 
bureaucrats assigned to women burden of failure for their modernist schemes.144 Nehru was 
particularly damning in his twinning of female agency and the food crisis. Visiting the Gujarati 
village of Gandhinagar, he contended that women should not complain about grain shortages, but 
instead, 'carry on with what they get.' Noting India's expenditure on food imports, he asserted 
that it had been women's desire for sugar which had forced the government to purchase it from 
abroad; their propensity for black market purchases of rationed commodities had further 
undermined government food control efforts.145 The failure of women to upkeep the new 
imperatives of postcolonial citizenship was seen as underwriting India's continued dependence. 
AIWC members nonetheless continued to view their efforts as instrumental in modelling 
domestic solutions to the food crisis. In July 1949, a month after Jawaharlal Nehru delivered a 
series of speeches on citizenship and the food problem on All India Radio, Indira Gandhi 
convened a meeting that led to the formation of the Women's Food Committee, Delhi, seeking to 
popularise subsidiary foods among women.146 In Bombay, Lilavati Munshi, outgoing AIWC 
president and wife of Food Minister K.M. Munshi, organised several state-funded substitute food 
exhibitions.147 A year later, in the wake of the Subsidiary Foods Production Committee's report, 
the Ministry of Food announced that it would be turning over the task of substitute food 
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promotion to a new All-India Women's Council for Supplementary Foods, funded by the 
Ministries of Food and Agriculture and comprising 'representatives of all-India Women's 
Organisations and prominent women active in public, social and Parliamentary life.'148  
The Council soon organised a series of exhibitions in Bombay and Delhi demonstrating 
recipes without rice and wheat. Rajendra Prasad inaugurated the Delhi exhibition, where Lilavati 
Munshi contended that the nation's food problem 'had baffled the greatest of our men,' but that 
women would no doubt find a solution, given that 'it is their province to handle food.'149 The 
Council's first booklet, touting substitute foods costing eight annas or less, was soon 
supplemented by an ambitious two-volume cookbook.150 And after two initial schemes for 
cafeterias in Bombay fell through, the Council opened the Annapoorna restaurant in Delhi in 
January 1951. India's 'most democratic restaurant' was staffed by women and served a buffet of 
substitute foods, quickly becoming an important political pilgrimage site. Beyond 'thousands of 
middle class and poor customers,' the cafeteria drew a steady stream of parliamentarians and 
diplomats, in addition to catering the 1951 Indian National Congress in Delhi. Appealing to 
women as the 'food ministers' of their own households, the AIWC continued to expand the 
Annapoorna chain nationwide, establishing thirty-two branches by 1955.151  
Even as the state continued to fund and subsidise the AIWC and its Annapoorna chain of 
restaurants, the nation's bureaucratic leadership continued to saddle women with the blame for 
Indian households' putative inability or unwillingness to change their food habits. As late as the 
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mid-1950s, Nehru was proclaiming that on the matter of food, 'women will justify themselves 
[sic] not so much by making demands but by the part they play in the building up of new 
India.'152 If rights, in postcolonial India's emerging conception of citizenship, stemmed only from 
the proper completion of duties, that compact was expected even more acutely of the nation's 
women.153 
 
Against the backdrop of a worsening food crisis, and India's continued inability to meet the 
targets of the renewed Grow More Food Campaign, legislators, writers, and satirists inveighed 
against the calls to miss meals and transform diets, their objections an implicit rejection of the 
new state's transferal of developmental responsibilities. These critiques linked substitute foods to 
the historical deprivations of famine, and rejected the modernist notion that, in the name of 
nation-building, one calorie might be just as readily taken as another.154 
The earliest, most trenchant critiques came from the Communist Party of India, which 
accused the Congress of promoting subsidiary foods and austerity at the expense of real agrarian 
reform. The CPI broadsheet People's Age reported frequently upon the callous statements of 
India's food officials. A 1948 report lambasted the Foodgrains Policy Committee's emphasis on 
substitute foods, and took Jairamdas Daulatram to task for asking a group of villagers, as they 
waited outside a ration depot, 'why after getting political freedom they have made themselves 
slaves of taste.'155 Two years later, as scarcity broke out nationwide, a party circular doubled 
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down on these charges. 'They advise the starving people to "miss a meal a week,"' it read, 'who 
are not getting even one full meal a day!'156 
The Communist assault anticipated a broader popular critique. In the summer of 1950, India's 
third Food Minister, Kanaiyalal Maneklal Munshi, traveled to Bihar, where poor villagers were 
said to be subsisting on jute leafs, and grinding tree branches into sawdust to pad empty 
stomachs.157 Munshi urged villagers to abandon the wheat and rice that kept the country wedded 
to foreign grain, asking women to mandate a weekly cereal-less day in their homes. A Times of 
India editorial sarcastically wondered if the starvation deaths that the Food Minister had denied 
were the victims' 'own fault, because they refuse to change their food habits, [and refuse] to eat 
grass and leaves?' Was it right, the journalist wondered, 'that the Biharis should die in this 
unpatriotic manner when their ears should be attuned to Ministerial sermons?' The nation could 
learn much from Bihar, the author continued sarcastically, by adopting Tuesday as a national jute 
leaf meal day. These days would 'combine nicely with Monday's vegetables, and prepare the 
stomach for the remaining five cereal-less days of the week.' The satirical journal Shankar's 
Weekly, a regular detractor of government food policy, ran a caricature of a smug K.M. Munshi 
surveying skeletal Biharis as they gnawed on trees, clutching a proclamation to 'eat more 
vegetables.'158 
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Increasingly, legislators and politicians voiced their own objections to the state's quixotic 
projects. Later in 1950, Madras parliamentarian and physician A.L. Mudaliar -- later director of 
the World Health Organisation -- deplored that 'when such suggestions are made to people who 
miss not only a meal in a week, but a meal every day, and who have neither vegetables nor 
anything else to consume, we ask: "What is the competence of the honourable Minister for Food 
to give such advice?"'159 An internal Ministry of Agriculture review assessed India's various 
Guest Control Orders as ineffective as they were unpopular, useful 'mainly for the psychological 
value.'160 Nehru's estranged secretary, M.O. Mathai, would recall the Prime Minister's faith in the 
Subsidiary Food Production Committee as akin to a 'drowning man clutching at a straw.'161 And 
C. Rajagopalachari drafted a private memorandum in January 1952 decrying state efforts to 
manage the minutiae of food production and consumption as an affront to personal liberty and a 
source of India's enduring hunger -- presaging his unilateral lifting of food controls in Madras six 
months later.162 Assessments from overseas were no more sympathetic. 'The tragedy,' an Eastern 
World correspondent wrote of the Miss a Meal campaign, 'is that millions of Indians have no 
choice of forgoing a meal, but are savagely dieted by poverty.'163 Implicit in these rejections 
lurked the notion the India's efforts to remake personal practice and sentiment represented the 
desperate campaigns of a weak state unable to actualise the promise of sustenance which had 
animated the nationalist struggle. 
 
The completion of India's First Five-Year Plan at the end of 1951 saw an assertive revision of 
India's agricultural planning. The Prime Minister had fended off internal political challenges 
from Sardar Patel and Purshottamdas Tandon -- conservative voices whose antipathy towards 
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socialist planning may have rendered the transformation of Indian citizenship, rather than that of 
agrarian structure, a more palatable shared goal.164 Beyond an emphasis on industrial 
development, the Plan concentrated on the coordinated transformation of rural India's social and 
economic conditions, affirming food production as a primary national goal. (These schemes were 
far more ambitious than the Grow More Food Movement, which had sought to induce production 
through relatively small monetary investments.) 'Unless the food problem is handled 
satisfactorily,' the Plan held, 'economic conditions in the country will not be stable enough to 
permit the implementation of the plan.'165 Its overwhelming focus on increasing agricultural 
output rendered the goal of transforming Indian diets a 'valuable supplement to the food supply.' 
Yet the campaign to remould citizens' diets and their relationship to the state in consort never 
fully receded from the national conversation. In years of higher agricultural production, when 
imports waned, the discussion of subsidiary foods, ersatz foodstuffs, and austerity receded from 
the limelight -- only to reemerge forcefully at moments of crisis.166 It was often industrialists and 
businessmen who continued to press for these ends. A year after the publication of the First Five-
Year Plan, the Andhra Chamber of Commerce heard the state's outgoing Industrial and 
Development Commissioner outline a scheme for a private subsidiary foods lobby.167 He, like 
the industrialists who had spearheaded the first subsidiary foods campaigns, was likely motivated 
by the aim of freeing up agricultural land used for cereals for the increased cultivation of 
exportable goods. 
At moments of uncertainty, however, officials revived the language of citizenship, rights, and 
responsibility to urge dietary transformations. The 1957 Foodgrains Enquiry Committee, chaired 
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by Ashok Mehta in the wake of a failed monsoon, lamented the turn away from subsidiary foods, 
which the economist held was 'an unfortunate result of the feeling that our food problem [was] 
purely transitory.'168 Mehta urged the Ministry of Food and Agriculture to establish a new 
department to promote the production and consumption of substitute foods. In June, a new 
Congress resolution reaffirmed the need for their consumption; the year afterwards, Lala Shri 
Ram would resurface to urge the creation of a 'Ministry for Non-Cereal Foods' -- proposals 
which earned the praise of the Eastern Economist.169 By the end of 1957, the Prime Minister had 
revived the language of personal transformation, exhorting Indians to 'change your food habits in 
accordance with the needs of the country.'170 Nehru's 'exasperated paternalism' remained in 
evidence. 'I am very worried,' the Prime Minister declared as the crisis continued, 'about this 
habit which seems to be growing of everybody asking somebody else to feed him, [of] 
everybody going to the State Government and saying, give us this, give us that. [...] Somehow, 
mind [sic] has become so perverted that we must have so much rice, and not take the other things 
which are better than rice, and in fact prefer starvation. I do not understand it.'171 Indians' failure 
to remake their diets, Nehru proposed, was a fundamental defect in their understanding of rights 
and responsibilities. 
The most iconic revival of the campaign came in in the mid-1960s, with the breakout of war 
with Pakistan presaging India's most significant food crisis since independence in the form of the 
Bihar Famine. The new Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, took up the call to 'miss a meal' 
once more. Newspapers echoed Shastri's call, at rallies, for weekly 'dinnerless days,' with the 
new slogan Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan -- 'Long live the soldier and the farmer' -- braiding together the 
aims of food and national defence.172 Congress rallied behind the Prime Minister, asking party 
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workers to go door-to-door in support of a new food austerity campaign.173 The Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry urged its members to refrain from receptions or 
dinner parties for the duration of the war, mooting a proposal to grow sweet potatoes in vacant 
factory lots.174 And as war ended, the Central Government sponsored a conservation campaign 
showing two chapattis separated from a third. 'Every third chapati you eat,' it proclaimed, 'is 
made from imported wheat. Let's not eat it.'175 
These calls for austerity, restraint, and the subjugation of preference were of little concrete 
value, yet they tapped into a familiar idiom borne of the immediate post-independence years. In 
January 1966, riots broke out in Kerala over the absence of rice in the rationing system, with 
protestors rejecting wheat sent from Punjab. As she jailed the Communist leaders said to be 
organising the riots, Indira Gandhi tapped deeply into that idiom. 'I pledge,' she told the rioters, 
'to surrender my rice ration for the people of Kerala. I also pledge not to eat or serve rice until the 
food situation there is normal.'176 
 
Conclusion 
 
'Adversity,' Education Minister Maulana Azad stated on India's first anniversary, 'is part of 
this independence package. The government needs courageous citizens. We have to lift burdens 
like strong, real men.'177 An analogous advertisement for a major bank ran a month after India’s 
independence, carrying the words of a nationalist financier, T.A. Pai, who would later become 
first president of the Food Corporation Of India. 'No food minister can give us food,' Pai wrote, 
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'and no finance minister can give us economic stability and independence, unless and until every 
man and woman in the country helps them.'178 
The language of adversity, austerity, and sacrifice suffused public institutions and public 
speech throughout India’s early independent years, structuring the efforts of state institutions and 
national leaders to remake Indian diets. This ethos built upon a diverse range of late colonial 
antecedents, from the international Malthusian debates over population, land, and people and the 
economic writing of early Indian nationalists to the colonial language of nutrition and the 
schemes for reconstruction proposed by Indian planners.179 Independence brought the nationalist 
concerns of human welfare and the amelioration of India’s agriculture to the fore of national 
planning efforts, but the need to forward a plan of economic self-reliance and free up resources 
for industrial development saw India’s leadership transferring the burden of food planning to 
citizens themselves, appealing to the qualities of virtue, shared burden, and sacrifice sutured to 
notions of postcolonial citizenship. In the years between independence and the Five Five-Year 
Plan, in particular, that leadership could frame enduring scarcity as an incomplete assumption of 
the obligations of citizenship. 'If you cannot give up your sugar, your wheat or your rice for a 
while,’ Nehru contended in an emblematic parliamentary debate in 1950, ‘then the biggest army 
will not be able to protect you, because you lack inner strength.'180  
The government of early independent India, Sunil Khilnani has argued, 'was transformed 
from a distant, alien object into one that aspired to infiltrate the everyday lives of Indians. [...] 
The state thus etched itself into the imagination of Indians in a way that no previous political 
agency had ever done.'181 The campaign to remake Indian diets exemplified this transformation, 
and the ways in which a state initially unable to actualise fundamental social and economic 
change attempted to restructure the sentiments and behaviours of its citizens themselves, casting 
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them as a fundamental obligation of postcolonial citizenship. Over the next decade, India’s 
postcolonial leadership would grow more confident in the state’s ability to undertake 
fundamental structural reform, and the 1950s were a high water mark in the state’s ‘romance 
with developmental planning.’182 The remaking of diets, however, remained a convenient idiom 
for a state at moments of scarcity and developmental uncertainty.  
By the time the technological advances of the Green Revolution began to take root in India in 
the form of the ‘new agricultural strategy” of the mid-1960s’ the focus of development planning 
had wholly shifted. If, in the earliest years of independence, the new state had looked to 
citizenship as an opportune site for transformation in the name of development, the relative 
inattentiveness of the state to the agrarian unrest and concentration of incomes wrought by the 
Green Revolution spoke to a paradigm of development that had become radically disjunct from 
questions of citizenship and shared sacrifice.183 The connection between citizenship and 
agricultural development would be left, in years to come, to representatives of the ‘new farmers’ 
movements’ whose populist narrative suggested that earlier nation-building efforts had been 
inimical to agrarian citizenship.184 For a crucial period, however, India’s public institutions and 
figures asked citizens to reimagine their relationship to the new state and their co-citizens, 
saddling Indians, and women in particular, to steward the transformations that would help realise 
the goal of national self-reliance. As India’s institutions and politicians charged citizens 
themselves with responsibility for their own sustenance, so, too, it charged them with the burden 
of the nation's development. 
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